dc.contributor.author | Moen, Espen R. | |
dc.contributor.author | Rosén, Åsa | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-08-29T11:55:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-08-29T11:55:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1891-599X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/95452 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper proposes a labor market model with job search frictions where workers
have private information on match quality and e¤ort. Firms use wage contracts to
motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We de ne and
characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context, and show that it satis es
a simple modi ed Hosios rule. The model is used to address the "Shimer puzzle"
related to the low volatility of the unemployment rate relative to the volatility of output
observed in the data. We nd that private information may increase the responsiveness
of the unemployment rate to changes in productivity and in particular to changes in
the information structure. | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
dc.publisher | BI Norwegian Business School | no_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREAM Publications;1/2010 | |
dc.subject | Private information | no_NO |
dc.subject | incentives | no_NO |
dc.subject | search | no_NO |
dc.subject | unemployment | no_NO |
dc.subject | wage rigidity | no_NO |
dc.title | Incentives in Competitive Search | no_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | no_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 50 pages | no_NO |