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Incentives in Competitive Search

Moen, Espen R.; Rosén, Åsa
Working paper
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2010_01_CREAM_wp.pdf (388.6Kb)
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/95452
Utgivelsesdato
2010
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Samlinger
  • Centre for Research in Economics and Management (CREAM) [18]
Sammendrag
This paper proposes a labor market model with job search frictions where workers

have private information on match quality and e¤ort. Firms use wage contracts to

motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We de ne and

characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context, and show that it satis es

a simple modi ed Hosios rule. The model is used to address the "Shimer puzzle"

related to the low volatility of the unemployment rate relative to the volatility of output

observed in the data. We nd that private information may increase the responsiveness

of the unemployment rate to changes in productivity and in particular to changes in

the information structure.
Utgiver
BI Norwegian Business School
Serie
CREAM Publications;1/2010

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