Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAndersen, Jørgen Juel
dc.contributor.authorAslaksen, Silje
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-30T11:44:30Z
dc.date.available2012-10-30T11:44:30Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1872-6089 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93724
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the articleno_NO
dc.description.abstractPolitical economy theories on the natural resource curse predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in o¢ ce. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political o¢ ce depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we nd that both institutions and resource types matter for the e¤ect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources a¤ects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive e¤ects on the duration in political o¢ ce, minerals are associated with negative duration e¤ects.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherElsevierno_NO
dc.subjectpolitical survivalno_NO
dc.subjectoilno_NO
dc.subjectnatural resourcesno_NO
dc.subjectinstitutionsno_NO
dc.titleOil and political survivalno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber89-106no_NO
dc.source.volume100no_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Development Economicsno_NO
dc.source.issue1no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.08.008


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record