Petro populism
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2375385Utgivelsesdato
2016Metadata
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Sammendrag
We aim to explain petro populism|the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support.
To reap the full gains of natural resource income, politicians need to remain in o ce over time.
Hence, even a rent-seeking incumbent who prioritizes his own welfare above that of citizens, will
want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in
o ce. While this incentive bene ts citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it adversely motivates
benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium,
politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they
realize cannot be sustained over time. Moreover, overextraction might even be reinforced as
voters become better informed.
Beskrivelse
This is the accepted and refereed manuscript of the article