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Petro populism

Matsen, Egil; Natvik, Gisle J.; Torvik, Ragnar
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2375385
Date
2016
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  • Scientific articles [1334]
Original version
Journal of Development Economics, 118(2016)1-12   10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.010
Abstract
We aim to explain petro populism|the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support.

To reap the full gains of natural resource income, politicians need to remain in o ce over time.

Hence, even a rent-seeking incumbent who prioritizes his own welfare above that of citizens, will

want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in

o ce. While this incentive bene ts citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it adversely motivates

benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium,

politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they

realize cannot be sustained over time. Moreover, overextraction might even be reinforced as

voters become better informed.
Description
This is the accepted and refereed manuscript of the article
Publisher
Elsevier
Journal
Journal of Development Economics

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