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Petro Populism

Matsen, Egil; Natvik, Gisle J.; Torvik, Ragnar
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/196697
Date
2014
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  • Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP) [124]
Abstract
We aim to explain petro populism|the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support.

To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time.

Hence, even a rent-seeking incumbent who prioritizes his own welfare above that of citizens,

will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining

in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the

adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and

services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while

voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time.
Publisher
BI Norwegian Business School
Series
CAMP Working Paper Series;1/2014

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