Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorHeggedal, Tom-Reiel
dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-31T08:47:28Z
dc.date.available2012-08-31T08:47:28Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1891-599X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/95462
dc.description.abstractFirst, we replicate the remarkable result of Hossain & Morgan (AER 2009), in which subjects in an experimental market tip almost perfectly to the superior platform even if an inferior platform enjoys initial monopoly. Next, we show that this result disappear when seemingly innocent increases in out-of-equilibrium payoffs are introduced. The inflated payoffs do not alter payoff- or risk-dominance relations, and does not impact on players' security levels. We conclude that the need for a theory of equilibrium selection cannot be bypassed by appealing to the realities of the (experimental) market place.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherBI Norwegian Business Schoolno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCREAM Publications;1/2012
dc.titleOngoing quest for QWERTYno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber12 pagesno_NO


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel