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dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.contributor.authorSørensen, Rune Jørgen
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-15T07:32:19Z
dc.date.available2012-08-15T07:32:19Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1573-7101 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93794
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.comno_NO
dc.description.abstractRepresentative democracy does not necessarily eliminate political corruption. Existing models explain the survival of rent-taking politicians by ideological divisions in the electorate and/or informational asymmetries. The current paper demonstrate that rent extraction can persist even if voters are fully informed and ideologically homogenous. We show that in such an environment, voters may gain by persistently reelecting a rent-taker that limits his rent extraction. Such an equilibrium occurs when voters and politicians do not discount the future too heavily, and the share of honest candidates is relatively small.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherSpringerno_NO
dc.subjectElectoral agencyno_NO
dc.subjectRent takingno_NO
dc.titlePersistent rent extractionno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber205-213no_NO
dc.source.volume153no_NO
dc.source.journalPublic Choiceno_NO
dc.source.issue1-2no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9785-z


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