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Persistent rent extraction

Helland, Leif; Sørensen, Rune Jørgen
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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Helland_Sørensen_PC_2012.pdf (142.9Kb)
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/93794
Utgivelsesdato
2012
Metadata
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  • Scientific articles [1667]
Originalversjon
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9785-z
Sammendrag
Representative democracy does not necessarily eliminate political corruption. Existing

models explain the survival of rent-taking politicians by ideological divisions in the

electorate and/or informational asymmetries. The current paper demonstrate that rent extraction can persist even if voters are fully informed and ideologically homogenous. We

show that in such an environment, voters may gain by persistently reelecting a rent-taker

that limits his rent extraction. Such an equilibrium occurs when voters and politicians do not discount the future too heavily, and the share of honest candidates is relatively small.
Beskrivelse
This is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Utgiver
Springer
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