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dc.contributor.authorAndersen, Jørgen Juel
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-15T07:14:58Z
dc.date.available2012-08-15T07:14:58Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1573-7101 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93390
dc.descriptionThis is the author’s final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.comno_NO
dc.description.abstractExisting theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation. A main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary, the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government than the presidential system. The proposed mechanism appears consistent with several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherSpringerno_NO
dc.subjectPolitical economyno_NO
dc.subjectConstitutionno_NO
dc.subjectTax costsno_NO
dc.subjectComparative politicsno_NO
dc.titleCosts of taxation and the size of governmentno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber83-115no_NO
dc.source.volume153no_NO
dc.source.journalPublic Choiceno_NO
dc.source.issue1-2no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9776-0


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