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Costs of taxation and the size of government

Andersen, Jørgen Juel
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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Andersen_PC_2012.pdf (350.9Kb)
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/93390
Utgivelsesdato
2012
Metadata
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  • Scientific articles [1334]
Originalversjon
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9776-0
Sammendrag
Existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system

promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends

the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation. A main result is that if taxation is

sufficiently distortionary, the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government

than the presidential system. The proposed mechanism appears consistent with several

empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories.
Beskrivelse
This is the author’s final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Utgiver
Springer
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