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dc.contributor.authorBleibtreu, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorStefani, Ulrike
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-16T13:23:46Z
dc.date.available2023-05-16T13:23:46Z
dc.date.created2022-11-17T12:33:04Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.citationReview of accounting studies. 2022, 1-51.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1380-6653
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3068226
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the effects of a prohibition of providing non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients. By combining a strategic auditor–client game with a circular market-matching model that has an endogenous number of auditors, we take into account the interdependence between the auditors’ and clients’ incentives, the market structure, and the quality of audited reports. We show that the regulation’s effects depend on the preexisting audit market concentration and the types of blacklisted NAS. In sharp contrast to the effects that regulators desire, a prohibition of providing NAS to audit clients can further increase audit market concentration and decrease the quality of audited reports if the fees that auditors previously earned from providing the blacklisted NAS were relatively high, compared to the reduction in audit costs that result from spillovers. In contrast, a prohibition of the NAS that generate intense spillovers and low NAS fees can have the unexpected—but desired—effect of decreasing market concentration; however, reporting quality also decreases.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe interdependence between market structure and the quality of audited reports: the case of non-audit servicesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectAudit market concentrationen_US
dc.subjectAudit market regulationen_US
dc.subjectCircular market-matching modelen_US
dc.subjectFinancial reporting qualityen_US
dc.subjectNon-audit servicesen_US
dc.subjectSpatial competitionen_US
dc.titleThe interdependence between market structure and the quality of audited reports: the case of non-audit servicesen_US
dc.title.alternativeThe interdependence between market structure and the quality of audited reports: the case of non-audit servicesen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber1-51en_US
dc.source.journalReview of accounting studiesen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11142-022-09734-9
dc.identifier.cristin2075544
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal