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dc.contributor.authorIachan, Felipe S.
dc.contributor.authorNenov, Plamen T.
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-02T11:46:50Z
dc.date.available2015-09-02T11:46:50Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 158(2015)Part B: 739-768nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.issn1095-7235
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/298470
dc.descriptionThis is the accepted and refereed manuscript to the articlenb_NO
dc.description.abstractWhen crises potentially originate from coordination failures, does a deterioration in the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability? We address this question in a general global game of regime change with a unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application. We show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime change, thus reducing stability, when the net payo in the case of a successful attack is more sensitive to the fundamentals than the net payo in the case of status quo survival. We also discuss welfare implications.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titleInformation quality and crises in regime-change gamesnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Theorynb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.005
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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