dc.contributor.author | Iachan, Felipe S. | |
dc.contributor.author | Nenov, Plamen T. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-02T11:46:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-09-02T11:46:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 158(2015)Part B: 739-768 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1095-7235 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/298470 | |
dc.description | This is the accepted and refereed manuscript to the article | nb_NO |
dc.description.abstract | When crises potentially originate from coordination failures, does a deterioration in
the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability?
We address this question in a general global game of regime change with a
unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application. We
show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime
change, thus reducing stability, when the net payo in the case of a successful attack is
more sensitive to the fundamentals than the net payo in the case of status quo survival.
We also discuss welfare implications. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | nb_NO |
dc.title | Information quality and crises in regime-change games | nb_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | nb_NO |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Economic Theory | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.005 | |
dc.description.localcode | 2, Forfatterversjon | nb_NO |