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Information quality and crises in regime-change games

Iachan, Felipe S.; Nenov, Plamen T.
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/298470
Date
2015
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Original version
Journal of Economic Theory, 158(2015)Part B: 739-768   10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.005
Abstract
When crises potentially originate from coordination failures, does a deterioration in

the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability?

We address this question in a general global game of regime change with a

unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application. We

show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime

change, thus reducing stability, when the net payo in the case of a successful attack is

more sensitive to the fundamentals than the net payo in the case of status quo survival.

We also discuss welfare implications.
Description
This is the accepted and refereed manuscript to the article
Publisher
Elsevier
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory

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