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dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.contributor.authorIachan, Felipe S.
dc.contributor.authorJuelsrud, Ragnar Enger
dc.contributor.authorNenov, Plamen
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-16T11:22:27Z
dc.date.available2021-12-16T11:22:27Z
dc.date.created2021-12-09T21:45:17Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2021, 191, 538-554.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2834685
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally test the effects of information quality in a global game of regime change. The game features a payoff structure such that more dispersed private information induces agents to attack more often and reduces regime stability in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We show that subjects in the lab do not play as predicted by equilibrium theory. Instead, more dispersed information makes subjects more cautious, increasing regime stability. We show that this finding is consistent with a modified global game model in which agents engage in level- thinking. In the level- model, information quality affects agents’ actions through a novel channel, that enables a strategic attenuation effect. As information quality worsens, strategic complementarities between different level- types weaken, generating a force that is capable of reversing the comparative statics from the equilibrium model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleInformation Quality and Regime Change: Evidence from the Laben_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber538-554en_US
dc.source.volume191en_US
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.08.036
dc.identifier.cristin1966843
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal