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Priming the weak negotiator to feel powerful in an integrative asymmetric batna negotiation

Helseth, Snorre
Master thesis
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Master Thesis Preliminary (0878774).pdf (2.196Mb)
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2484417
Date
2017
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  • Master of Science [1117]
Abstract
Power asymmetries are present in most negotiations, and power influences

economic outcomes in negotiations. The most common way to manipulate power

asymmetries in negotiation experiments is through BATNA, Best Alternative To

Negotiated Agreement. Research has shown that individuals with a stronger

BATNA claim higher economic outcomes than their counterpart´s. Another used

tool in manipulating power is through priming one party to feel powerful prior to

the negotiation, and this manipulation has also indicated higher economic value

claiming for the individual being primed to feel powerful in BATNA symmetric

negotiations. This study includes three experiments, and investigates both

individual outcomes across roles, and joint outcomes across experiments, as well

as subjective outcomes. The study investigates whether priming a negotiator with

weaker BATNA than their counterpart to feel powerful, can leverage the

advantage of the individual with the stronger BATNA. Furthermore, whether

knowledge (perceived power) or no knowledge (potential power) about BATNA

asymmetries between the negotiators influence the economic outcome of the

individual being primed to feel powerful. The results for this study indicate a

small increase for the weak negotiators being primed to feel powerful (M =

7753.33, SD = 2024.80) in comparison to the weak negotiators who were not

primed (M = 7716.67, SD = 2395.84) in asymmetric BATNA negotiations with

perceived power. However, none of the results found showed to be statistically

significant. Joint outcome scores across experiments show that negotiations

without knowledge (potential power) about the BATNA asymmetries scored

higher (M = 16506.67, SD = 2454.40) than negotiations with knowledge

(perceived power) about the BATNA asymmetries (M = 15793.33, SD =

2454.82). However, none of the results found showed to be statistically

significant. The results and the limitations of the study are discussed, and future

research is outlined.
Description
Masteroppgave(MSc) in Master of Science in Leadership and Organizational Psychology - Handelshøyskolen BI, 2017
Publisher
BI Norwegian Business School

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