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dc.contributor.authorBerner, Eva Charlotte
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-25T11:41:15Z
dc.date.available2018-01-25T11:41:15Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2479639
dc.descriptionMasteroppgave(MSc) in Master of Science in Business, Finance - Handelshøyskolen BI, 2017nb_NO
dc.description.abstractThis thesis studies agency problems in the United Nations and how these agency problems are characterised. Two models of agency problems are studied; career concerns, and pay-for-performance. This thesis finds that contractors concern for a future contract works as an incentive to exert effort driving down leave. The United Nations Staff are not incentivised in this manner. This thesis concludes that United Nations is affected by agency problems and it is likely that these agency problems are characterised by career concerns.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherBI Norwegian Business Schoolnb_NO
dc.subjectfinansnb_NO
dc.subjectfinancenb_NO
dc.titleHigh-level bureaucrat compensation in the United Nationsnb_NO
dc.typeMaster thesisnb_NO


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