dc.contributor.author | Berner, Eva Charlotte | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-01-25T11:41:15Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-01-25T11:41:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2479639 | |
dc.description | Masteroppgave(MSc) in Master of Science in Business, Finance - Handelshøyskolen BI, 2017 | nb_NO |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis studies agency problems in the United Nations and how these agency
problems are characterised. Two models of agency problems are studied; career
concerns, and pay-for-performance. This thesis finds that contractors concern for
a future contract works as an incentive to exert effort driving down leave. The
United Nations Staff are not incentivised in this manner. This thesis concludes
that United Nations is affected by agency problems and it is likely that these
agency problems are characterised by career concerns. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | BI Norwegian Business School | nb_NO |
dc.subject | finans | nb_NO |
dc.subject | finance | nb_NO |
dc.title | High-level bureaucrat compensation in the United Nations | nb_NO |
dc.type | Master thesis | nb_NO |