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High-level bureaucrat compensation in the United Nations

Berner, Eva Charlotte
Master thesis
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1759856.pdf (3.504Mb)
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2479639
Utgivelsesdato
2017
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Samlinger
  • Master of Science [1116]
Sammendrag
This thesis studies agency problems in the United Nations and how these agency

problems are characterised. Two models of agency problems are studied; career

concerns, and pay-for-performance. This thesis finds that contractors concern for

a future contract works as an incentive to exert effort driving down leave. The

United Nations Staff are not incentivised in this manner. This thesis concludes

that United Nations is affected by agency problems and it is likely that these

agency problems are characterised by career concerns.
Beskrivelse
Masteroppgave(MSc) in Master of Science in Business, Finance - Handelshøyskolen BI, 2017
Utgiver
BI Norwegian Business School

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