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dc.contributor.authorLu, Zongwei
dc.contributor.authorRiis, Christian
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-20T12:36:54Z
dc.date.available2017-12-20T12:36:54Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn1891-599X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2473314
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we investigate an incomplete information model of generalized second price auctions with allocative externalities originating from the heterogeneous match rates of bidders. A novel feature of our model is that it generates endogenous click-through rates (CTRs). In this setting, we establish existence of symmetric efficient equilibria for common classes of primitives. This contrasts with the findings of Gomes and Sweeney (2014), who study a similar model but with fixed CTRs. Moreover, non-existence results require strong assumptions on the primitives of the model. We conclude that existence of equilibria in GSP with incomplete information is quite general.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherBI Norwegian Business Schoolnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCREAM Publications;1/2016
dc.titleBayes-Nash Equilibria in Generalized Second Price Auctions with Allocative Externalitiesnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212nb_NO


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