dc.contributor.author | Lu, Zongwei | |
dc.contributor.author | Riis, Christian | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-12-20T12:36:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-12-20T12:36:54Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1891-599X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2473314 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we investigate an incomplete information model of generalized second price auctions
with allocative externalities originating from the heterogeneous match rates of bidders. A novel feature
of our model is that it generates endogenous click-through rates (CTRs). In this setting, we establish
existence of symmetric efficient equilibria for common classes of primitives. This contrasts with the
findings of Gomes and Sweeney (2014), who study a similar model but with fixed CTRs. Moreover, non-existence results require strong assumptions on the primitives of the model. We conclude that existence of equilibria in GSP with incomplete information is quite general. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | BI Norwegian Business School | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREAM Publications;1/2016 | |
dc.title | Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Generalized Second Price Auctions with Allocative Externalities | nb_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | nb_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 | nb_NO |