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dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-20T13:15:58Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-03T09:06:09Z
dc.date.available2016-07-20T13:15:58Z
dc.date.available2017-11-03T09:06:09Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Journal, 2017, 127(605), F474-F494nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1468-0297
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2463890
dc.descriptionThe accepted and peer reviewed manuscript to the articlenb_NO
dc.description.abstractThis article focuses on political dynasties’ potential consequences, and particularly investigates whether and when they lead to the selection of dynastic politicians with relatively lower education levels. I exploit the different electoral constraints faced by distinct subsets of Italian local politicians to identify whether weaker constraints on political selection processes induce the selection of dynastic politicians with lower education levels relative to their non-dynastic peers. The analysis – which covers almost 540,000 Italian local politicians active during the period 1985–2012 – indicates that a political selection process controlled by politicians rather than the electorate favours dynastic individuals with relatively lower levels of education.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherWileynb_NO
dc.titlePolitical Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians’ Human Capitalnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.date.updated2016-07-20T13:15:58Z
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.journalEconomic Journalnb_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12444
dc.identifier.cristin1368815
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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