• Liquidity and Shareholder Activism 

      Norli, Øyvind; Østergaard, Charlotte; Schindele, Ibolya (CCGR Working Paper;1/2014, Working paper, 2014)
      Blockholders' incentives to intervene in corporate governance are weakened by free-rider problems and high costs of activism. Theory suggests activists may recoup expenses through informed trading of target firms' stock ...
    • Why Do Boards Exist? Governance in the Absence of Corporate Law 

      Burkart, Mike; Miglietta, Salvatore; Østergaard, Charlotte (CCGR Working Paper;1/2017, Working paper, 2017)
      We study how owners trade off the costs and benefits of establishing a board in a historical setting, where boards are optional and authority over corporate decisions can be freely allocated across the general meeting, the ...