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dc.contributor.authorFiva, Jon H.
dc.contributor.authorNatvik, Gisle J.
dc.date.accessioned2014-02-04T12:46:44Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1573-7101
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93968
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the articleno_NO
dc.description.abstractAn insight from dynamic political economy is that elected officials may use state variables to affect the choices of their successors. We exploit the staggered timing of local and national elections in Norway to investigate how politicians' re-election probabilities affect their investments in physical capital. Because popularity is endogenous to politics, we use an instrumental variable approach based on regional movements in ideological sentiment. We find that higher re-election probabilities stimulate investments, particularly in purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbent parties. This aligns with theory where capital and current expenditures are considered complementary inputs to government production.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherSpringerno_NO
dc.subjectStrategic capital accumulationno_NO
dc.subjectincumbent popularityno_NO
dc.titleDo re-election probabilities influence public investment?no_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.description.embargo2014-10-01
dc.source.pagenumber305-331no_NO
dc.source.volume157no_NO
dc.source.journalPublic Choiceno_NO
dc.source.issue1-2no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9946-8


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