Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.contributor.authorMonkerud, Lars Christian
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-10T08:11:39Z
dc.date.available2013-11-01T00:00:23Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn1460-3667 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93784
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the articleno_NO
dc.description.abstractModels of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selec- tion that voters can acheive in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief-formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, forms the central plank of more complex electoral agency models. Our de- sign seeks to limit the behavioral impact of social preferences. We nd little support for the baseline model in our data. However, simple (nonrational) learning rules explain behavioral patterns well. Simula- tions indicate that non-rational learning drives behavior most force- fully towards equilibrium in situations that are favorable to Bayesian updating.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherSage Publicationsno_NO
dc.subjectelectoral agencyno_NO
dc.subjectexperimentno_NO
dc.subjectlearningno_NO
dc.titleElectoral agency in the lab: learning to throw out the rascalsno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber214-233no_NO
dc.source.volume25no_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Theoretical Politicsno_NO
dc.source.issue2no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629812460120


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record