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dc.contributor.authorBourjade, Sylvain
dc.contributor.authorSchindele, Ibolya
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-20T11:46:23Z
dc.date.available2013-02-20T11:46:23Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93766
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the articleno_NO
dc.description.abstractThis paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers incentives to exert e¤ort, a pro t-maximizing nancier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-o¤ between raising pro ts through increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small sizeno_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherElsevierno_NO
dc.subjectGroup lendingno_NO
dc.subjectMoral Hazardno_NO
dc.subjectSocial capitalno_NO
dc.titleGroup lending with endogenous group sizeno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber556-560no_NO
dc.source.volume117no_NO
dc.source.journalEconomics Lettersno_NO
dc.source.issue3no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.034


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