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dc.contributor.authorGrytten, Jostein Ivar
dc.contributor.authorSkau, Irene
dc.contributor.authorSørensen, Rune Jørgen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-12T08:59:07Z
dc.date.available2012-09-12T08:59:07Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Health Economics, 30(2011)1: 163-180
dc.identifier.issn0167-6296 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93654
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the articleno_NO
dc.description.abstractWe address models that can explain why expert patients (obstetricians, midwives and doctors) are treated better than non-experts (mainly non-medical training). Models of statistical discrimination show that benevolent doctors treat expert patients better, since experts are better at communicating with the doctor. Agency theory suggests that doctors have an incentive to limit hospital costs by distorting information to non-expert patients, but not to expert patients. The hypotheses were tested on a large set of data, which contained information about the highest education of the parents, and detailed medical information about all births in Norway during the period 1967 to 2005 (Medical Birth Registry). The empirical analyses show that expert parents have a higher rate of Caesarean section than non-expert parents. The educational disparities were considerable 40 years ago, but have become markedly less over time. The analyses provide support for statistical discrimination theory, though agency theory cannot be totally excluded.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherElsevierno_NO
dc.subjectstatistical discriminationno_NO
dc.subjectagency theoryno_NO
dc.subjectCaesarean sectionno_NO
dc.subjectexpert patientsno_NO
dc.subjectdisparitiesno_NO
dc.titleDo expert patients get better treatment than others? Agency discrimination and statistical discrimination in obstetricsno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber163-180no_NO
dc.source.volume30no_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Health Economicsno_NO
dc.source.issue1no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.10.004


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