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dc.contributor.authorBøhren, Øyvind
dc.contributor.authorJosefsen, Morten G.
dc.contributor.authorSteen, Pål E.
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-12T08:34:58Z
dc.date.available2012-10-12T08:34:58Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1872-6372 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93642
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the articleno_NO
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherElsevierno_NO
dc.subjectOrganizational formno_NO
dc.subjectCorporate governanceno_NO
dc.subjectStakeholdersno_NO
dc.subjectDividendsno_NO
dc.subjectBanksno_NO
dc.titleStakeholder conflicts and dividend policyno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber2852-2864no_NO
dc.source.volume36no_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Banking and Financeno_NO
dc.source.issue10no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.06.007


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