Deferred Prosecution Agreements as Miscarriage of Justice: An Exploratory Study of Corporate Convenience

Abstract

Deferred prosecution agreements and similar arrangements are practiced in many countries when there is suspicion of corporate crime. It is an agreement based on a negotiation that permits the allegedly guilty party not to undergo a criminal trial if they avoid committing further wrongdoing for a specified period of time. This article reviews such agreements in light of two different situations where the corporation is actually guilty and where the corporation is actually not guilty. An innocent company signing such an agreement suffers from miscarriage of justice. A guilty company on the other hand can restore the convenience of committing corporate crime. This article argues that deferred prosecution agreements violate basic principles of justice. The research suggests that serious fraud offices and other public bodies need to be restored to enable complete criminal prosecution when there are suspicions of corporate wrongdoing. This suggestion is based on the assumption that the underlying problem is law enforcement incompetence at investigating and prosecuting corporate crime.