Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes

dc.contributor.author	Sigstad, Henrik
dc.contributor.author	Lambais, Guilherme
dc.date.accessioned	2023-07-20T10:59:31Z
dc.date.available	2023-07-20T10:59:31Z
dc.date.created	2022-12-12T11:08:21Z
dc.date.issued	2023
dc.identifier.issn	0047-2727
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3080419
dc.description.abstract	Are politicians in power treated more leniently in court? We show that Brazilian mayoral candidates charged with misconduct are 65 percent less likely to be convicted if they narrowly win the election. Politicians play no direct role in the judges’ careers, suggesting that formal independence does not completely insulate the judiciary from political influence. The effect is driven by districts with few judges and by judges with higher career instability.	en_US
dc.language.iso	eng	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier	en_US
dc.rights	Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no	*
dc.subject	Judicial independence	en_US
dc.subject	Official misconduct	en_US
dc.title	Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes	en_US
dc.title.alternative	Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes	en_US
dc.type	Peer reviewed	en_US
dc.type	Journal article	en_US
dc.description.version	publishedVersion	en_US
dc.source.volume	217	en_US
dc.source.journal	Journal of Public Economics	en_US
dc.identifier.cristin	2091829
cristin.ispublished	true
cristin.fulltext	original
cristin.qualitycode	2

Med mindre annet er angitt, så er denne innførselen lisensiert som Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal