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dc.contributor.authorSigstad, Henrik
dc.contributor.authorLambais, Guilherme
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-20T10:59:31Z
dc.date.available2023-07-20T10:59:31Z
dc.date.created2022-12-12T11:08:21Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3080419
dc.description.abstractAre politicians in power treated more leniently in court? We show that Brazilian mayoral candidates charged with misconduct are 65 percent less likely to be convicted if they narrowly win the election. Politicians play no direct role in the judges’ careers, suggesting that formal independence does not completely insulate the judiciary from political influence. The effect is driven by districts with few judges and by judges with higher career instability.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectJudicial independenceen_US
dc.subjectOfficial misconducten_US
dc.titleJudicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomesen_US
dc.title.alternativeJudicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomesen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.volume217en_US
dc.source.journalJournal of Public Economicsen_US
dc.identifier.cristin2091829
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal