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dc.contributor.authorBos, Olivier
dc.contributor.authorMartinez, Francisco Gomez
dc.contributor.authorOnderstal, Sander
dc.contributor.authorTruyts, Tom
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-06T11:07:51Z
dc.date.available2023-01-06T11:07:51Z
dc.date.created2021-06-10T13:43:06Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2021, 187 448-469.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3041525
dc.description.abstractWe study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the bidders’ payments to an outside observer. We find that the all-pay sealed-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subjectExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subjectAuksjonaren_US
dc.subjectAuctionsen_US
dc.subjectAdferdsøkonomien_US
dc.subjectBehavioral economicsen_US
dc.titleSignalling in auctions: Experimental evidenceen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderThe Authorsen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Økonomi: 210en_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Economics: 210en_US
dc.source.pagenumber448-469en_US
dc.source.volume187en_US
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001
dc.identifier.cristin1915072
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 250506en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal