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dc.contributor.authorGollwitzer, Anton
dc.contributor.authorOlcaysoy Okten, Irmak
dc.contributor.authorOsorio Pizarro, Angel
dc.contributor.authorOettingen, Gabriele
dc.date.accessioned2022-08-02T09:28:31Z
dc.date.available2022-08-02T09:28:31Z
dc.date.created2022-07-21T17:15:06Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Experimental Psychology: General. 2022. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Online First Publication, May 19, 2022.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0096-3445
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3009746
dc.description.abstractExamining the epistemic and social–cognitive structures underlying fanaticism, radicalization, and extremism should shed light on how these harmful phenomena develop and can be prevented. In nine studies (N = 3,277), we examined whether discordant knowing—felt knowledge about something that one perceives as opposed by most others—underlies fanaticism. Across multifaceted approaches, experimentally manipulating participants’ views to fall under this framework (e.g., “I am certain about X, but most other people think X is unknowable or wrong”) heightened indicators of fanaticism, including aggression, determined ignorance, and wanting to join extreme groups in the service of these views. Additional analyses found that this effect occurs via threat-based mechanisms (Studies 1–7), can be intervened on to prevent fanaticism (Study 2), is conditional on the potency of opposition (Study 3), differs from effects on extremism (Study 4), and extends to mental representations of the self (Study 5). Generalizing these findings to real-world contexts, inducing participants with discordant knowledge about the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and the morality of abortion heightened fanaticism regarding these topics (Studies 6 and 7). Additionally, antivaccine fanatics and followers of a real-world fanatical religious group exhibited greater discordant knowing than nonfanatical individuals (Studies 8 and 9). Collectively, the present studies suggest that a specific epistemic structure— discordant knowing—underlies fanaticism, and further, highlight the potential of investigating constructs like fanaticism from an epistemic social cognitive perspectiveen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Psychological Associationen_US
dc.subjectdiscordant knowingen_US
dc.subjectepistemologyen_US
dc.subjectextremismen_US
dc.subjectfanaticismen_US
dc.subjectsocial cognitionen_US
dc.titleDiscordant knowing: A social cognitive structure underlying fanaticismen_US
dc.title.alternativeDiscordant knowing: A social cognitive structure underlying fanaticismen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderAmerican Psychological Associationen_US
dc.source.journalJournal of experimental psychology. Generalen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1037/xge0001219
dc.identifier.cristin2039018
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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