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dc.contributor.authorHope, Ole-Kristian
dc.contributor.authorLu, Haihao
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-10T08:50:40Z
dc.date.available2022-05-10T08:50:40Z
dc.date.created2020-10-23T13:42:54Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationAccounting Review. 2020, 95 (4), 263-290.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0001-4826
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2994983
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission regulation that mandated public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, we find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, and that the reduction in RPTs is negatively associated with the implied cost of capital (ICC) and positively related to Tobin's Q. These effects are more pronounced for low-monitored firms and for firms with RPTs that are more likely to be opportunistic. We further find that firms with a formal written policy, a designated committee to review and approve RPTs, or more extensive disclosure on RPT governance benefit in terms of lower ICC.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Accounting Associationen_US
dc.titleEconomic consequences of corporate governance disclosure: Evidence from the 2006 SEC regulation on related-party transactionsen_US
dc.title.alternativeEconomic consequences of corporate governance disclosure: Evidence from the 2006 SEC regulation on related-party transactionsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber263-290en_US
dc.source.volume95en_US
dc.source.journalAccounting Reviewen_US
dc.source.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.2308/ACCR-52608
dc.identifier.cristin1841817
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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