Party Cues and Incumbent Assessments under Multilevel Governance
Journal article, Peer reviewed
Accepted version
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2977483Utgivelsesdato
2020Metadata
Vis full innførselSamlinger
- Scientific articles [2254]
Sammendrag
Politicians' party membership allows voters to overcome incomplete information issues. In this article, we maintain that such ‘party cues’ in multilevel governance structures also induce voters to incorporate their assessment of incumbents at one level of government into their assessment of incumbents at other levels of government. Moreover, we argue that these assessment ‘spillovers’ increase in magnitude with voters' level of political information. They become particularly prominent for voters with higher levels of political knowledge and interest as well as during election periods (when information is less costly and more readily available). Empirical analyses using survey data from Germany covering the period 1990 to 2018 corroborate our theoretical propositions.