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dc.contributor.authorGottschalk, Petter
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-25T09:01:33Z
dc.date.available2019-11-25T09:01:33Z
dc.date.created2019-09-13T20:49:20Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of procurement management. 2019, 12(6), 621-631.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1753-8432
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2630179
dc.description.abstractWe address the following research question in this article: how can convenience theory in terms of motive, opportunity, and willingness explain deviant behaviour in the case of public procurement of healthcare services in a Norwegian municipality? This research is important, as it can identify motives at the individual and organisational level, opportunities at the organisational and societal level, and willingness at the individual level, even when there is not necessarily corruption involved. The application of convenience theory is by no means an excuse for violations of laws and regulations. Rather, this article demonstrates where prevention of misconduct and crime needs attention. It is particularly at the organisational level, where opportunity structures tend to enable commitment and concealment of illegitimate financial transactions. When auditing and other forms of control are de facto absent, where the blame game occurs, and where it is impossible to trace events because documents and e-mails have disappeared, then misconduct and crime become convenient options.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.titleApplication of the theory of convenience to a case of illegal Public procurement of Healthcare servicesnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber621-631nb_NO
dc.source.volume12nb_NO
dc.source.journalInternational Journal of procurement managementnb_NO
dc.source.issue6nb_NO
dc.identifier.cristin1724635
cristin.unitcode158,4,0,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for ledelse og organisasjon
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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