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dc.contributor.authorHoff, Christoffer
dc.contributor.authorNordli, Andreas
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-09T13:37:38Z
dc.date.available2019-10-09T13:37:38Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2621222
dc.descriptionMasteroppgave(MSc) in Master of Science in Business, Finance - Handelshøyskolen BI, 2019nb_NO
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines how managerial incentives affect certain deal characteristics in acquisitions and how these characteristics are related to announcement returns and shareholder wealth. Based on our own results and extensive research, we identify large and diversifying acquisitions to be value-destroying. Our findings suggest that performance-based compensation, e.g. bonus and stock options, incentivizes the manager to acquire firms that maximize shareholder wealth. Furthermore, we present empirical evidence that CEO duality reduce the probability of engaging in diversifying, value-destroying acquisitions. These findings suggest that managerial incentives significantly affect shareholder wealth in context of acquisitions, where performance-based compensation and CEO duality prevent valuedestroying acquisitions to some extent.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherHandelshøyskolen BInb_NO
dc.subjectfinancenb_NO
dc.subjectfinansnb_NO
dc.titleDo managerial incentives prevent value-destroying acquisitions?nb_NO
dc.typeMaster thesisnb_NO


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