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dc.contributor.authorGottschalk, Petter
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-08T12:21:04Z
dc.date.available2019-08-08T12:21:04Z
dc.date.created2019-05-23T18:09:00Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationPakistan Journal of Criminology. 2019, 11 (1), 1-15.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn2074-2738
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2607610
dc.description.abstractAfter an oil spill in the Gulf, British Petroleum had to compensate victims of the accident. The total compensation was $11 billion. As suggested by the theory of convenience, a financial motive, an organizational opportunity and a personal willingness can explain deviant behavior by members of the elite in society to gain from the compensation program. In the case of the BP Deepwater Horizon settlements, attorneys were both presenting claims on behalf of victims as well as approving claims on behalf of petroleum company BP. It was a profitable assignment for attorneys, and some attorneys made it even more profitable for themselves by kickbacks and by both applying for and approving compensations. As illustrated in this case study, a report of investigation can serve as an empirical basis for the study of convenience theory.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherThe Pakistan Society of Criminology (PSC)nb_NO
dc.subjectConvenience theorynb_NO
dc.subjectFraud examinationnb_NO
dc.subjectWhite-collar crimenb_NO
dc.titleBP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claim Investigated by Special Master Freeh: A Case for Application of Convenience Theory to White-Collar Misconductnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.rights.holderThe publisher Pakistan Society of Criminology has kindly given their permission to deposit the article open access in BI Open.nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber1-15nb_NO
dc.source.volume11nb_NO
dc.source.journalPakistan Journal of Criminologynb_NO
dc.source.issue1nb_NO
dc.identifier.cristin1699909
cristin.unitcode158,4,0,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for ledelse og organisasjon
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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