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dc.contributor.authorDe Witte, Kristof
dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.contributor.authorSchönhage, Nanna Lauritz
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-11T09:03:59Z
dc.date.available2018-07-11T09:03:59Z
dc.date.created2018-07-09T15:39:47Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Urban Economics. 2018, 106(July), 46-58.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0094-1190
dc.identifier.issn1195-9068
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2505125
dc.description.abstractPolitical economists have long maintained that politicians respond to both (re-)election and financial incentives. This article contributes to the latter literature by analysing whether, when and how local office-holders respond to the economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and remuneration of local politicians. Building on insights from the urban economics and public finance literatures, we argue that local politicians may strategically adjust fiscal and housing policies to stimulate in-migration when approaching a population threshold where their remuneration increases. Using data from all 589 Belgian municipalities over the period 1977–2016, our results confirm that approaching important population thresholds causes lower local tax rates and the granting of additional building permits (particularly for apartments). These policy changes occur early in the election cycle and, at least for housing policy, are restricted to incumbent mayors themselves expecting to benefit from crossing the population threshold.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titleStrategic public policy around population thresholdsnb_NO
dc.title.alternativeStrategic public policy around population thresholdsnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber46-58nb_NO
dc.source.volume106nb_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Urban Economicsnb_NO
dc.source.issueJulynb_NO
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2018.06.001
dc.identifier.cristin1596424
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO
cristin.unitcode158,3,0,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for samfunnsøkonomi
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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