dc.contributor.author | Jørgensen, Kjell | |
dc.contributor.author | Skjeltorp, Johannes A. | |
dc.contributor.author | Ødegaard, Bernt Arne | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-08T09:50:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-08T09:50:34Z | |
dc.date.created | 2018-02-14T14:50:12Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Financial Markets. 2018, 37(1), 1-16 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.issn | 1386-4181 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1878-576x | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2489452 | |
dc.description | The accepted and peer reviewed manuscript to the article | nb_NO |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate the effects of introducing a fee on excessive order-to-trade ratios (OTRs) on market quality at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). We find that traders reacted to the regulation as measured OTRs fell. However, market quality, measured with depth, spreads, and realized volatility, remain largely unaffected. This result differs sharply from the experience in other markets, such as Italy and Canada, where similar regulatory changes have been accompanied by a worsening of liquidity. The unchanged market quality at the OSE is likely due to the different design of the regulation, which is tailored to encourage liquidity supply. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | nb_NO |
dc.title | Throttling hyperactive robots: Order-to-trade ratios at the Oslo Stock Exchange | nb_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 1-16 | nb_NO |
dc.source.volume | 37 | nb_NO |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Financial Markets | nb_NO |
dc.source.issue | 1 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2017.09.001 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1565230 | |
dc.description.localcode | 1, Forfatterversjon | nb_NO |
cristin.unitcode | 158,1,0,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Institutt for finans | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |