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CEO Dividend Protection

Zhang, Danielle
Journal article, Peer reviewed
Accepted version
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2472556
Date
2018
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  • Publikasjoner fra CRIStin - BI [833]
  • Scientific articles [2147]
Original version
Journal of Empirical Finance, 2018, 45(1), 194-211   10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.005
Abstract
This paper studies CEO dividend protection, an important element in the executive compensation package that protect CEOs’ compensation from stock price drops due to dividend payments. First, I show that there is large variation among S&P 500 firms in whether they provide dividend protections to their CEOs or not. Second, CEO dividend protection is positively associated with firms’ dividend payout. Third, a time series analysis suggests that dividend protection is implemented prior to a firm increasing dividends. Finally, there is no evidence suggesting that CEO dividend protection affects other corporate policies, such as cash holdings and investment.
Description
The accepted and peer reviewed manuscript to the article
Publisher
Elsevier
Journal
Journal of Empirical Finance

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