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How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia; Zhang, Danielle
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2461164
Date
2017
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  • Scientific articles [1362]
Original version
Review of Finance, 2017, 21(5), 1805-1846   https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfx019
Abstract
We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We show that the optimal contract protects the CEO from losses for bad outcomes and is convex for medium outcomes and concave for good outcomes. We calibrate the model to data on 1,707 CEOs and show that it explains observed contracts much better than the standard model without risk-taking incentives. When we apply the model to contracts that consist of base salary, stock, and options, the results suggest that options should be issued in the money. Our model also helps us rationalize the universal use of at-the-money options when the tax code is taken into account. Moreover, we propose a new way of measuring risk-taking incentives in which the expected value added to the firm is traded off against the additional risk a CEO has to bear.
Description
As the lead article in this issue the article is made free of charge on the OUP website, even to non-subscribers. https://academic.oup.com/rof
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Journal
Review of Finance

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