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dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.contributor.authorHeggedal, Tom-Reiel
dc.contributor.authorSørensen, Rune Jørgen
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-19T12:59:19Z
dc.date.available2017-07-19T12:59:19Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economics, 152(2017), 47-54nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.issn1879-2316
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2449041
dc.descriptionThe accepted and peer reviewed manuscript to the article cited below. It may contain minor differences from the journal's pdf versionnb_NO
dc.description.abstractRecent research explores the effect of financial and career incentives on public-sector hiring processes and subsequent performance. The reverse relation between performance and bureaucrats' compensation and turnover has received only limited attention. Due to the distinct features of public-sector organizations, bureaucrats are traditionally argued to require either permanent positions and fixed wages, or low-powered performance incentives. This article studies how the performance of top civil servants in Norwegian local governments affects their compensation and turnover. We thereby build on a unique new dataset over the period 1991–2014. Our results indicate that better performing top civil servants obtain a higher compensation and are less likely to be replaced. Nonetheless, these incentives remain low-powered in line with agency theory prescriptions..nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titleAre bureaucrats paid like CEOs? Performance compensation and turnover of top civil servantsnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Public Economicsnb_NO
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.05.006
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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