| dc.description.abstract | In this master thesis, we investigate managerial ownership as a possible
determinant of corporate cash holdings in a sample of Norwegian corporations
listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange. We focus on the importance of managerial
ownership as a disciplinary factor with respect to how companies deploy cash, in
addition to interrelated factors such as corporate governance and controlling
owners, leverage, and growth opportunities. We fail to find evidence in support of
managerial ownership affecting cash holdings when we only control for general
firm-specific characteristics. However, under some circumstances, i.e. when we
interact managerial ownership with a proxy for growth opportunities
(MKTBOOK), we find that managerial ownership has a significant negative effect
on cash holdings. Given that our empirical findings, to a large extent, do not
support a statistically significant relationship between managerial ownership and
cash holdings, we cannot unambiguously motivate and recommend initiation of
managerial ownership with the purpose of solving a potential agency conflict
between shareholders and managers. | nb_NO |
