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dc.contributor.authorAakre, Stine
dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.contributor.authorHovi, Jon
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-14T13:59:34Z
dc.date.available2016-10-14T13:59:34Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Conflict Resolution, 60 (2016) 7: pp 1312-1340nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0022-0027
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2415306
dc.descriptionThis is the accepted, refereed and final manuscript to the articlenb_NO
dc.description.abstractWe study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Second, they indicate that compliance enforcement will boost compliance significantly in the presence of participation enforcement. Our results also add to the experimental literature on public goods provision, again in two ways. First, they reveal that previous experimental findings of enforcement boosting cooperation are valid only in settings with forced (or enforced) participation. Second, they show that subjects’ willingness to allocate costly punishment points is significantly stronger when the enforcement system permits punishment of both types of free riding than when it permits punishment of only one type.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSagenb_NO
dc.titleWhen does informal enforcement work?nb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber1312-1340nb_NO
dc.source.volume60nb_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Conflict Resolutionnb_NO
dc.source.issue7nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0022002714560349
dc.description.localcode2, forfatterversjonnb_NO


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