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Mandatory gender balance and board independence

Bøhren, Øyvind; Staubo, Siv
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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LOCKED until 20.02.2017 due to copyright restrictions (223.9Kb)
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2378836
Date
2016
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  • Scientific articles [1334]
Original version
European Financial Management, 22(2016)1: 3-30   http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12060
Abstract
We find that forcing radical gender balance on corporate boards is associated with increased board independence and reduced firm value. A mandatory 40-percent gender quota shifts the average fraction of independent directors from 46 to 67 percent because female directors are much more often independent directors than males are. This shock to board independence via gender quotas is strongest in small, young, profitable, non-listed firms with powerful stockholders and few female directors. Such firms also lose the most value, presumably because they need advice from dependent directors the most and monitoring by independent directors the least.
Description
This is the accepted and refereed manuscript of the article
Publisher
Wiley
Journal
European Financial Management

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