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dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.contributor.authorSørensen, Rune Jørgen
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-25T11:38:08Z
dc.date.available2016-01-25T11:38:08Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationElectoral Studies, 39(2015)September: 117-128nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0261-3794
dc.identifier.issn1873-6890
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2374700
dc.descriptionThis is the authors' accepted and refereed manuscript to the article.nb_NO
dc.description.abstractElectoral agency models suggest that government e¢ ciency is better when voters penalize poor performance, and party competition is balanced. Uncertainty in the electoral mechanism dillutes the incentive to produce e¢ ciently. We test this proposition on panel data on local governments. The dataset includes a broad set of indicators on service output and quality, which facilitates the measurement of cost e¢ ciency. We use historical data on local voting in national elections to measure partisan bias, while electoral volatility is measured on past variations in neighboring municipalities. The empirical analyses show that partisan bias lowers cost e¢ ciency, particu- larly in municipalities with large electoral volatility.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titlePartisan bias, electoral volatility, and government efficiencynb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.journalElectoral Studiesnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.electstud.2015.05.002
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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