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dc.contributor.authorBjønnes, Geir Høidal
dc.contributor.authorHolden, Steinar
dc.contributor.authorRime, Dagfinn
dc.contributor.authorSolheim, Haakon O. Aa
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-19T16:08:25Z
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-21T12:58:36Z
dc.date.available2014-11-19T16:08:25Z
dc.date.available2014-11-21T12:58:36Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationScandinavian Journal of Economics, 116(2014)2: 506-538nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0347-0520
dc.identifier.issn1467-9442
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/226311
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. LOCKED until 2016-03-01 due to copyright restrictionsnb_NO
dc.description.abstractWhat is the role of “large players” (e.g., hedge funds) in speculative attacks? Recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack. However, many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest-rate differentials. We propose a model in which large players can do both. Using data on currency trading by foreign (large) and local (small) players, we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone during the 1990s. During the attack on the Swedish krona after the Russian moratorium in 1998, foreign players moved early. Gains by delaying attack were small, however, because interest rates did not increase.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherWileynb_NO
dc.title'Large' versus 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacksnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.date.updated2014-11-19T16:08:25Z
dc.source.journalScandinavian Journal of Economicsnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/sjoe.12044
dc.identifier.cristin988105
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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