Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBøhren, Øyvind
dc.contributor.authorStaubo, Siv
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-07T14:29:58Z
dc.date.available2014-11-07T14:29:58Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Corporate Finance, 28(2014): 152-168nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199
dc.identifier.issn1872-6313
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/225477
dc.descriptionThis is the author's accepted version of the article, post refereeing.nb_NO
dc.description.abstractNorway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form. Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, we find that mandatory gender balance may produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or inefficient boards.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titleDoes mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board upheavalnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Corporate Financenb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.005
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record