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dc.contributor.authorMichelsen, Claus
dc.contributor.authorBoenisch, Peter
dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-10T11:56:42Z
dc.date.available2014-06-10T11:56:42Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationPublic Choice, 159(2014)3-4: 469-483nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1573-7101
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/196286
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. Publisher's version is available at link.springer.com/nb_NO
dc.description.abstractA vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision – and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels – likewise affects voters’ turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSpringernb_NO
dc.subjectVoter turnoutnb_NO
dc.subjectInstitutionsnb_NO
dc.subjectFederalismnb_NO
dc.subjectParadox of votingnb_NO
dc.title(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence from German municipalitiesnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber469-483nb_NO
dc.source.volume159nb_NO
dc.source.journalPublic Choicenb_NO
dc.source.issue3-4nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11127-013-0061-2
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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