Browsing Handelshøyskolen BI by Journals "Games and Economic Behavior"
Now showing items 1-6 of 6
-
An equilibrium characterization of an all-pay auction with certain and uncertain prizes
(Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2016)In the important contribution “All pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes” published in Minchuk and Sela (2014), the authors analyze an all pay auction with multiple prizes. The specific feature of the model is ... -
Can Paying Politicians Well Reduce Corruption? The Effects of Wages and Uncertainty on Electoral Competition
(Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2022)We investigate the effects of wages and uncertainty on political corruption as measured by rent-taking. First, our laboratory data show that contrary to standard theory, rent-taking is not independent of, but decreases ... -
Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
(Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2021)We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. ... -
Political Rents and Voter Information in Search Equilibrium
(Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)Political parties commited to grab rents may run for election, and even win, if citizens are uninformed. But, how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly ... -
Political Rents and Voter Information in Search Equilibrium
(Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)Political parties committed to grab rents may run for election, and even win, if citizens are uninformed. But, how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly ... -
The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
(Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2022)We experimentally investigate the role of two-sided reputation-building in dynamic bargaining. In the absence of outside options, rational bargainers have an incentive to imitate obstinate types that are committed to an ...