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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kjell Arne
dc.contributor.authorCiccone, Alice
dc.contributor.authorHeggedal, Tom-Reiel
dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-18T10:47:11Z
dc.date.available2024-04-18T10:47:11Z
dc.date.created2023-12-01T12:02:50Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.issn0347-0520
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3127201
dc.description.abstractWe introduce loss aversion in an infinite-horizon, alternating-offers model. When outside options serve as reference points, the equilibrium of our model follows that of the standard Rubinstein bargaining model, i.e., outside options do not affect the equilibrium unless they are binding. However, when reference points are given by the resources players contribute to the pie, the bargaining outcome changes such that a player's share increases in her contribution. We test our model's predictions in the laboratory. As predicted, only binding outside options impact the division of the pie. Data also show that contributions matter for bargaining outcomes when they are activated as reference points, but not quite as predicted by our theory. Proposers gain a higher share of the pie only when they have contributed a higher share than the opponent has.en_US
dc.description.abstractReference points in sequential bargaining: theory and experimenten_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleReference points in sequential bargaining: theory and experimenten_US
dc.title.alternativeReference points in sequential bargaining: theory and experimenten_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber254–288en_US
dc.source.volume126en_US
dc.source.journalThe Scandinavian Journal of Economicsen_US
dc.source.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/sjoe.12552
dc.identifier.cristin2207318
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
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